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Prospective hazard analysis methodologies, like failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), have been tried and
tested in the engineering industry and are more recently gaining momentum in healthcare. Considering FMEA’s
evidence based successes, this commentary makes the case that healthcare is underutilizing the methodology by
relying on retrospective hazard analysis. Healthcare leaders should determine where prospective hazard analysis
principles could be better built into care delivery planning and processes that will enhance patient safety.
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The field of medicine has traditionally been built on a
reactive approach of healing illness, rather than preventing
it. Likewise, healthcare improvement has traditionally
focused on improving existing processes and analyzing
errors after they have occurred. In contrast, to arrive at
the advanced safety levels, as seen in high reliability orga-
nizations, there is a need for commitment of top manage-
ment commitment for the time and resources needed to
advance the safety culture, and for trust in front-line em-
ployees to provide key input about the safety changes
needed [1].
In a recent IJHPR article, Fanny Ofek et al. report on
the use of prospective hazard analysis to implement policy
change for intravenous potassium chloride (IV KCl) ad-
ministration. They review the impetus for change, criteria
for selection of the failure mode and effect analysis
(FMEA) methodology, and the patient safety enhance-
ments that resulted from successful utilization of the
methodology [2]. The authors discussed the motives for
changing the policy and administration methods for IV
KCl, including to reduce the risk of accidental overdose of
high-alert medications. The matter was urgent, impacted* Correspondence: Prathibha.Varkey@ynhh.org
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treatment patterns. Utilization of the FMEA method-
ology was selected because Ofek et al. decided to pro-
spectively intervene in harm reduction before the new
policy was implemented.
Organizations always face competing priorities. Matrix
and prioritization grids can provide assistance when trying
to select patient safety projects in that context. They in-
volve assessing criteria, such as urgency, level of impact,
likeliness of occurrence, complexity, and anticipated value
of the safety project [3–5]. FMEA methodology is similar
to the matrix and prioritization grids in that it provides a
systematic prioritization of factors. It differs uniquely,
however, from other patient safety methodologies by being
prospective, rather than retrospective.
A commonly used tool in the field of engineering, the
FMEA has been used since the early 1990s to increase
safety and consumer satisfaction, reduce cost, and reduce
product time to market [6]. Several institutions, such as
the Mayo Clinic, have adopted engineering principles
more rapidly by including their engineering department as
a part of the care team to bring process expertise to the
table with clinicians. The engineers facilitate prospective
hazard analysis when implanting new procedural tech-
niques or adopting new technologies. In general, the
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Since the early 2000s, the Veteran’s Administration
National Centre for Patient Safety has utilized a health-
care specific version of FMEA called healthcare failure
mode and effect analysis (HFMEA) [7]. While FMEA
and HFMEA work to accomplish the same goal of pro-
active hazard analysis, HFMEA modifies the FMEA
hazard scoring processes and decision-making steps to
bring more specificity to healthcare settings.
Retrospective event analysis, including root cause
analysis, is similar to FMEA in that steps of process
mapping, data analysis, and cause analysis must occur.
One important distinction of root cause analysis from
FMEA is that harm has already occurred and it is reac-
tionary. In being reactive and retrospective, we con-
tinue to rely on analyses of errors after they have
occurred, while not investing in building new safety
processes and devices. In order to accelerate achieve-
ment of the patient safety ideal of zero preventable ad-
verse events, prospective measures can and should be
used with greater frequency.
Challenges involved in implementing FMEA and other
prospective hazard analyses include investment in time
and resources, training, and management commitment
[6, 8]. Considering the FMEA process step of assembling
a multidisciplinary action team, including patient-facing
caregivers, a modest time commitment as well is neces-
sary to map the process and identify failure modes.Conclusions
Ofek et al., through successful risk avoidance using the
FMEA methodology, achieved much more than clinical
quality and safety enhancements; they also increased
the functional health and well-being of the population
they served, reduced costs associated with complica-
tions, and achieved clinician and patient satisfaction
with the process. Their outcomes demonstrate the
value proposition behind preventing errors using pro-
spective hazard analysis.
With recent publications suggesting that the epidemic
of medical errors (now ranked third in leading causes
of death in the US) persists, a re-look and overhaul of
our current patient safety tools and processes seems
imperative [9]. Future research should focus on deter-
mining the areas in healthcare where FMEA principles
could be built into processes and devices prior to im-
plementation, while continuing retrospective root cause
analyses in situations where errors have occurred des-
pite precautions.
Abbreviations
FMEA: Failure mode and effect analysis; HFMEA: Healthcare failure mode and




Availability of data and materials
Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or
analysed during the current study.
Authors’ contributions
LG and Dr. PV co-authored the commentary. LG is lead author and Dr. PV is
corresponding author. Both authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Authors’ information
Lewis Goodrum is an administrative fellow with Yale New Haven Health
System.
Dr. Prathibha Varkey is the President and Chief Executive Officer of Northeast
Medical Group and Senior Vice President of Yale New Haven Health. She also
serves as president of the American College of Medical Quality and she is an
Adjunct Professor of Medicine and an Adjunct Professor of Preventive Medicine
in the Mayo Clinic College of Medicine.
Commentary on
This is a commentary on DOI: 10.1186/s13584-016-0090-7
Competing interests
Both authors declare that they no competing interests.
Consent for publication
Not applicable.
Ethics approval and consent to participate
Not applicable.
Author details
1Yale New Haven Health, 2 Howe St., New Haven, CT 06511, USA. 2Yale New
Haven Health Northeast Medical Group, 99 Hawley lane, 3rd Flr, Stratford, CT
06614, USA.
Received: 28 December 2016 Accepted: 30 December 2016
References
1. Hudson P. Implementing a safety culture in a major multi-national. Saf Sci.
2007;45(6):697–722.
2. Ofek F, Magnezi R, Kurzweil Y, Gazit I, Berkovitch S, Tal O. Introducing a
change in hospital policy using FMEA methodology as a tool to reduce
patient hazards. Isr J Health Policy Res. 2016;5(1):30.
3. Varkey, P. (Ed.). Medical quality management: theory and practice.
Burlington: Jones & Bartlett Publishers. 2010.
4. Dumbravă V, Iacob VS. Using probability–impact matrix in analysis and risk
assessment projects. Descrierea CIP/Description of CIP–Biblioteca Națională
a României Conferința Internațională Educație și Creativitate pentru o
Societate Bazată pe Cunoaștere–ŞTIINŢE ECONOMICE. 2013;42.
5. Hsieh YJ, Huang LY, Wang CT. A framework for the selection of six sigma
projects in services: case studies of banking and health care services in
Taiwan. Serv Bus. 2012;6(2):243–64.
6. Dale BG, Shaw P. Failure mode and effects analysis in the UK motor industry:
a state-of-the-art study. Qual Reliab Eng Int. 1990;6(3):179–88.
7. DeRosier J, Stalhandske E, Bagian JP, Nudell T. Using health care failure mode
and effect analysis™: the VA National Center for Patient Safety’s prospective risk
analysis system. Joint Comm J Qual Patient Saf. 2002;28(5):248–67.
8. Vincent CA. Analysis of clinical incidents: a window on the system not a search
for root causes. Qual Saf Health Care. 2004;13(4):242–3.
9. Makary MA, Daniel M. Medical error—the third leading cause of death in
the US. BMJ. 2016;353:i2139.
